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STOCKHOLDER INSPECTION RIGHTS AND AN “INCREDIBLE” 
BASIS: SEEKING DISCLOSURE RELATED TO CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Gabrielle Palmer* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Corporations are creatures of state law.2 The state of incorporation 
determines the rights of shareholders and managers.3 As part of this regu-
latory process, state law provides shareholders with the right to inspect 
the books and records of corporations. Described by courts as a “power-
ful right,”4 the authority is “an important part of the corporate govern-
ance landscape.”5 
The federal securities laws also regulate the disclosure by public 
companies. In the 1930s, Congress assigned to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) the authority to develop an affirmative dis-
closure regime for these companies.6 Under the Securities Act of 1933 
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC adopted a comprehen-
sive framework that required “issuers to disclose information about the 
company, its business, and its management periodically and upon the 
occurrence of specified events.”7  
Neither system has proved particularly hospitable to the disclosure 
of information related to matters of corporate social responsibility. In-
spection rights have traditionally been limited to matters of corporate 
wrongdoing. Similarly, the securities laws focused on information mate-
rial to investors, a category that generally does not include socially re-
sponsible activities.8 Pressure has, however, increased for the disclosure 
of this type of information. In 2010, Congress sought to promote corpo-
rate social transparency. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer 
  
 * J.D. and Corporate and Commercial Law Certificate Candidate, May 2015 
 2. Frederick Tung, Article, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 
J. CORP. L. 33, 33 (2006). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Disney v. Walt Disney Co., 857 A.2d 444, 447 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
 5. Sec. First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563, 571 (Del. 1997) (en banc). 
 6. J. Robert Brown, Jr., Article, Corporate Governance, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, and the Limits of Disclosure, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 45, 45–92 (2007). In fact, the “funda-
mental purpose” of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in which Congress delegated regulatory 
authority to the SEC, “was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat 
emptor . . . .” SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). 
 7. Alison B. Miller, Note, Navigating the Disclosure Dilemma: Corporate Illegality and the 
Federal Securities Laws, 102 GEO. L.J. 1647, 1652 (2014). 
 8. Rachel Cherington, Securities Laws and Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward an 
Expanded Use of Rule 10b-5, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1439, 1447 (2004). 
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Protection Act (Dodd-Frank)9 required affirmative disclosure about con-
flict minerals10 and natural resource extraction payments.11 Although 
relatively narrow topics, they represented examples of Congress impos-
ing on the SEC the obligation to write disclosure rules on matters de-
signed to promote social well-being. 
In the aftermath of these changes at the federal level, Delaware law 
has arguably undergone a shift, making information on corporate social 
responsibility accessible through inspection rights.12 In Louisiana Munic-
ipal Employees’ Retirement System v. Hershey, the Chancery Court de-
nied a motion to dismiss an inspection request seeking information about 
the use of child labor and human trafficking in the defendant’s supply 
chain.13 The court indicated that shareholders could meet the standards 
for inspection through the use of public information about child labor on 
cocoa farms in West Africa.14 As evidence of the “possibility of misman-
agement,” the court accepted an inference that arose from a correlation 
between public information about human rights abuses in West Africa 
and the company’s acknowledgment of concern about the issue.15 
This article seeks to examine inspection rights in Delaware, with a 
particular emphasis on the availability of materials relating to corporate 
social responsibility. Part II discusses the requirements of the governing 
law—namely, Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. 
Part III concerns the incredible pleading standards that Section 220 im-
poses on shareholders requesting information about public companies. 
Part IV explores the relationship between inspection rights and corporate 
social responsibility. Finally, Part V discusses the Hershey decision and 
Part VI analyzes the possible shift in Delaware standards when issues of 
social responsibility are involved. 
II. THE GOVERNING LAW: DELAWARE CODE SECTION 220 
A. Overview 
Inspection rights have long existed under Delaware law.16 Common 
law provided that stockholders were “entitled to know . . . how [their] 
agents were conducting the affairs of the corporation of which [the 
  
 9. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 10. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A) (2012). 
 11. Id. § 78m(q)(2)(A). 
 12. See generally Rulings of the Court From Oral Argument on Exceptions to the Master’s 
Final Report, La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Hershey Co., No. 7996-ML (Del. Ch. Mar. 18, 
2014). 
 13. Id. at 3-4. 
 14. Id. at 17-22. 
 15. Id.  
 16. S. Mark Hurd & Lisa Whittaker, Books and Records Demands and Litigation: Recent 
Trends and Their Implications for Corporate Governance, 9 DEL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006). 
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stockholder] was a part owner.”17 Enforcement of these rights required a 
writ of mandamus from the Delaware Superior Court.18 In 1967, the leg-
islature codified the common law right of inspection in Section 220 of 
the Delaware General Corporation Law.19 Under the provision, stock-
holders20 have the right to inspect the corporation’s books and records 
“for any proper purpose.”21 Shareholders must submit a written demand 
that specifies the requisite purpose.22 The corporation has five days to 
respond to, and comply with, the demand.23 In the absence of a timely 
response, “the stockholder may apply to the Court of Chancery for an 
order to compel such inspection.”24 When seeking inspection of corpo-
rate books and records other than a corporate stock list, shareholders bear 
the burden of establishing a proper purpose.25 
B. Proper Purpose 
Proper purpose has been described as “[t]he paramount factor in de-
termining” entitlement to inspection rights.26 The requirement prevents 
access to corporate records out of “sheer curiosity” and avoids harass-
ment to the corporation.27 A proper purpose must be “reasonably related 
to such person’s interest as a stockholder”28 and not “adverse to the best 
interests of the corporation.”29 In general, this requires an allegation of 
wrongdoing by the board.30  
Examples of proper purpose include contentions that: corporate as-
sets were comingled with those of a controlling shareholder;31 fiduciary 
  
 17. Shaw v. Agri-Mark, Inc., 663 A.2d 464, 467 (Del. 1995). 
 18. Hurd & Whittaker, supra note 16, at 2. 
 19. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2010). 
 20. The statute also allows beneficial owners to seek inspection. See id. § 220(a)(1). Benefi-
cial owners must produce evidence of ownership. See Cent. Laborers Pension Fund v. News Corp., 
45 A.3d 139, 141 (Del. 2012) (en banc) (affirming the Chancery Court’s finding that plaintiff’s 
“failure to attach documentary evidence of its beneficial ownership” warranted dismissal).  
 21. tit. 8, § 220(b). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Skouras v. Admiralty Enters., 386 A.2d 674, 678 (Del. Ch. 1978) (noting under Section 
220, the “burden of proving a proper purpose is on the stockholder, where, as here, the demand is for 
inspection of books and records rather than for a stock list”). 
 26. CM & M Grp. v. Carroll, 453 A.2d 788, 792 (Del. 1982). 
 27. Id. 
 28. tit. 8, § 220(b). 
 29. Skouras, 386 A.2d at 678.  
 30. Sec. First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563, 567 (Del. 1997) (en banc) 
(“It is well established that investigation of mismanagement is a proper purpose for a Section 220 
books and records inspection.”); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 681 A.2d 1026, 1031 
(Del. 1996) (noting same); Freund v. Lucent Techs., Inc., No. Civ.A. 18893, 2003 WL 139766, at *3 
(Del. Ch. Jan. 9, 2003) (noting same); Helmsman Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. A & S Consultants, Inc., 525 
A.2d 160, 165 (Del. Ch. 1987); see also Seinfeld v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 909 A.2d 117, 121 
(Del. 2006) (en banc) (“Such investigations are proper, because where the allegations of misman-
agement prove meritorious, investigation furthers the interest of all stockholders and should increase 
stockholder return.”). 
 31. Doerler v. Am. Cash Exch., Inc., No. 7640VCG, 2013 WL 616232, at *6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 
19, 2013) judgment entered by No. 7640-VCG, 2013 WL 1720895 (Del. Ch. Apr. 19, 2013). 
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duties were violated in connection with related party transactions;32 and 
executives were excessively compensated for performing minimal du-
ties.33 The standard is generally met where the stockholder pleads mis-
management in the context of self-dealing transactions or “financial ir-
regularities.”34 
On rare occasions, Delaware courts have recognized that sharehold-
ers need not allege mismanagement.35 Instead, shareholders, as owners, 
have the inherent right to obtain certain types of information irrespective 
of fault. For example, Delaware courts have allowed shareholders to ob-
tain documents relating to the valuation of their shares absent allegations 
of wrongdoing.36  
Shareholders also need not allege mismanagement when exploring 
director qualifications. In City of Westland Police & Fire Retirement 
System v. Axcelis Technologies, Inc.,37 the company had in place a “plu-
rality-plus” voting provision requiring any director failing to receive 
majority vote to tender a letter of resignation to the Nominating and 
Governance Committee, which then recommends board action with re-
spect to the resignation.38 Pursuant to the provision, three directors re-
signed and submitted the required letter.39 The board, however, did not 
accept their resignations.40  
In the aftermath, a stockholder filed a Section 220 action alleging 
that the Board’s rejection of such directors’ resignations “established a 
credible basis to infer that the Board intended to entrench those three 
directors (and indeed the entire Board) in office.”41 The Chancery Court 
disagreed, concluding that the shareholders had not presented credible 
evidence supporting the claim of entrenchment.42  
  
 32. See generally Amalgamated Bank v. UICI, No. Civ.A. 884-N, 2005 WL 1377432 (Del. 
Ch. June 2, 2005). 
 33. Haywood v. Ambase Corp., No. Div.A. 342-N, 2005 WL 2130614, at *5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 
22, 2005). 
 34. Holman v. Nw. Broad., L.P., No. 1572-VCN, 2007 WL 1074770, at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 
2007). 
 35. See, e.g., CM & M Grp. v. Carroll, 453 A.2d 788, 792 (Del. 1982) (valuation of shares is a 
proper purpose). 
 36. See generally id. (granting inspection rights where stockholder sought valuation in order 
to sell his stock where the corporation was closely held with no publicly traded shares and where 
shares were subject to substantial restrictions on resale). Moreover, intent to solicit proxies is suffi-
cient to meet the proper purpose threshold without allegations of wrongdoing by the Board. W. Air 
Lines, Inc. v. Kerkorian, 254 A.2d 240, 241 (Del. 1969). 
 37. City of Westland Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Axcelis Techs., Inc., 1 A.3d 281 (Del. 2010) 
(en banc).  
 38. Id. at 283. 
 39. Id. at 284.  
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 283. 
 42. City of Westland Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Axcelis Techs., Inc., No. 4473-VCN, 2009 
WL 3086537, at *5 (Del. Ch. Sept. 28, 2009) aff'd, 1 A.3d 281 (Del. 2010) (en banc).  
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On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court found director suitability 
to be a proper purpose, even absent allegations of mismanagement.43 
Stockholders had an inherent right to information regarding director 
qualifications because, with regard to governance issues, they “may ex-
press dissatisfaction only through the electoral check.”44 Nonetheless, 
because the Axcelis stockholder relied on allegations of entrenchment 
and not suitability, the court affirmed the lower court’s decision.45  
A proper purpose, therefore, must relate to a stockholder’s status as 
part owner of the company.46 In general, the courts have limited these 
rights to allegations of mismanagement. Nonetheless, some issues, such 
as director qualifications and share valuation, are viewed as inherently 
important to stockholders such that they do not need to be accompanied 
by allegations of wrongdoing. 
III.  DELAWARE COMMON LAW AND THE NEED FOR A CREDIBLE BASIS 
In pleading a “proper purpose,” neither allegations of “general 
mismanagement” nor “mere suspicions” of wrongdoing will suffice.47 
Instead, courts have grafted on an additional requirement not contained 
in the statute. Shareholders must allege a “credible basis” for any such 
claim.48 A credible basis requires “some evidence of possible misman-
agement as would warrant further investigation of the matter . . . .”49  
Stockholders can meet this threshold by presenting “documents, 
logic, testimony or otherwise” that suggest “legitimate issues of wrong-
doing.”50 The standard does not require affirmative evidence of misman-
agement but rather a showing that corporate wrongdoing is possible 
based on a preponderance of the evidence.51  
Although described as setting “the lowest possible burden of 
proof,”52 the credible basis standard is not insubstantial. In Shamrock 
  
 43. Axcelis, 1 A.3d at 290.  
 44. Id. (quoting Pershing Square, L.P. v. Ceridian Corp., 923 A.2d 810, 817–18 (Del. Ch. 
2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 45. Id. 
 46. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2010).  
 47. Shamrock Activist Value Fund, L.P. v. iPass Inc., No. 2462-N, 2006 WL 3824882, at *1 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 15, 2006). 
 48. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 681 A.2d 1026, 1031 (Del. 1996). 
 49. Sec. First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563, 568 (Del. 1997) (en banc) 
(quoting Helmsman Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. A & S Consultants, Inc., 525 A.2d 160, 166 (Del. Ch. 
1987)). 
 50. Id. Note, however, that information widely available through the media may not be suffi-
cient to meet this standard. See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833 
A.2d 961, 981 (Del. Ch. 2003) aff'd, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004) (en banc). 
 51. Rulings of the Court From Oral Argument on Exceptions to the Master’s Final Report, 
supra note 12 (“Stockholders need only show by a preponderance of the evidence a credible basis 
from which the Court of Chancery can infer that there is possible mismanagement that would war-
rant further investigation, a showing that may ultimately fall well short of demonstrating that any-
thing wrong occurred.” (emphasis added)).  
 52. Seinfeld v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 909 A.2d 117, 123 (Del. 2006) (en banc). 
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Activist Value Fund, L.P. v. iPass Inc., stockholders asserted as a proper 
purpose that the company board failed to achieve certain projected bene-
fits as a result of a merger with GoRemote.53 As evidence of misman-
agement, stockholders pointed to “the divergence between projections 
and results . . . .”54 The court refused to infer mismanagement based on 
incorrect projections.55 Stockholders instead had to show “something 
more.”56 
Shareholders did, however, succeed in showing “something more” 
with respect to the claim that the Company failed to plan for GoRemote’s 
integration.57 Specifically, the complaint alleged that the company for-
mulated a plan only after the Plaintiff wrote a letter asking about one, 
that the company’s website directed unhappy customers on how to con-
vert from the Company’s services to GoRemote, and that shortly after 
execution of the merger, the officer responsible for overseeing the inte-
gration of the two companies left the company.58 This evidence, the court 
concluded, “provide[d] the basis for an inference that mismanagement 
possibly occurred.”59 
Credible basis can also be met through expert testimony. In Dobler 
v. Montgomery Cellular Holding Co., Inc.,60 a stockholder sought docu-
ments to determine, among other things, whether mismanagement or 
waste had occurred with respect to transactions engaged in or authorized 
by the company’s single board member.61 To meet the credible basis 
requirement, the stockholder presented testimony from an expert in valu-
ation and forensic accounting that identified “red flags” in the financial 
statements.62 The red flags focused on advances made by the company to 
affiliates.63 The red flags coupled with concern over “the apparent lack of 
documentation for significant transactions with affiliates”64 was suffi-
cient to establish the requisite credible basis.65  
  
 53. Shamrock Activist Value Fund, L.P. v. iPass Inc., No. 2462-N, 2006 WL 3824882, at *1 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 15, 2006). 
 54. Id. at *2. 
 55. Id. (“Predictions of the consequences of implementing corporate decisions (i.e., the taking 
of risk) and the failure of those predictions to materialize do not, without more, share a logical nexus 
with mismanagement.”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at *2 n.14. 
 59. Id. at *2. Accordingly, the company’s motion to dismiss was denied because the stock-
holder pled a credible basis from which the court could infer wrongdoing with respect to the merger. 
Id.  
 60. Nos. Civ.A. 18105 NC, Civ.A. 18499, 2001 WL 1334182 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 2001). 
 61. Id. at *4. 
 62. Id. at *2, *4.  
 63. Id. at *4. 
 64. Id. at *5. 
 65. Id. at *4. The court in Magid v. Acceptance Insurance Co. found that expert testimony 
was sufficient to meet the credible basis threshold. See No. Civ.A. 17989-NC, 2001 WL 1497177, at 
*7 (Del. Ch. Nov. 15, 2001). Specifically, the plaintiff’s expert testified that “management’s failure 
to adjust on a timely basis the Company’s loss reserves in response to” a California Supreme Court 
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Stockholders have met the credible basis threshold by presenting a 
variety of other types of evidence, including: potential misconduct identi-
fied in SEC orders;66 the presence of transactions that allegedly imparted 
a “personal material benefit” on directors and which “carried serious 
adverse consequences” to the company;67 an unusually quick settlement 
of a derivative action;68 and the failure to hold a stockholders meeting 
over a three year period, especially when combined with allegations that 
the corporation’s founder made statements about unauthorized loans and 
an intent to dilute shares.69 
Mere disagreements with management’s judgment, however, will 
not suffice to create an inference of wrongdoing. In Seinfeld v. Verizon 
Communications,70 a shareholder filed a Section 220 action alleging the 
compensation paid to Verizon’s three highest officers “was excessive 
and wasteful.”71 The plaintiff asserted that compensation totaling $205 
million over three years was unwarranted.72  
The shareholder acknowledged, however, that he lacked any factual 
support for the claims of wrongdoing.73 Nonetheless, requiring a credible 
basis of wrongdoing would impose an “insurmountable barrier” to the 
exercise of inspection rights under Section 220.74 As a result, the plaintiff 
argued that “minority shareholders who have access only to public doc-
uments and without a whistle blower or corporate documents should be 
permitted to have limited inspection based upon suspicions, reasonable 
beliefs, and logic arising from public disclosures.”75  
  
decision that “significantly expanded” the company’s risk exposure “constituted a reasonable basis 
for concluding that mismanagement may have occurred.” Id. at *3.  
 66. Carapico v. Phila. Stock Exch., Inc., 791 A.2d 787, 792 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“While ‘[m]ere 
curiosity or a desire for a fishing expedition will not suffice,’ a purpose of investigating the miscon-
duct identified in the SEC Order and the payment of severance benefits to officers or employees 
implicated in the SEC inquiry is sufficiently concrete.” (quoting Sec. First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting 
& Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563, 568 (Del. 1997) (en banc)). See also Freund v. Lucent Techs., Inc., No. 
Civ.A. 18893, 2003 WL 139766, at *3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 9, 2003) (the existence of formal SEC investi-
gations coupled with shareholder litigation relating to a decline in stock value was sufficient). 
 67. Khanna v. Covad Commc'ns Grp., No. 20481-NC, 2004 WL 187274, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 
23, 2004). 
 68. Everett v. Hollywood Park, Inc., No. 14556, 1996 WL 32171, at *5 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 
1996). 
 69. Marmon v. Arbinet-Thexchange, Inc., No. Civ.A. 20092, 2004 WL 936512, at *2, *5 
(Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 2004). 
 70. 909 A.2d 117 (Del. 2006) (en banc). 
 71. Id. at 118.  
 72. Id. at 119. 
 73. Id. (“During his deposition, Seinfeld acknowledged he had no factual support for his 
claim that mismanagement had taken place. He admitted that the three executives did not perform 
any duplicative work. Seinfeld conceded he had no factual basis to allege the executives ‘did not 
earn’ the amounts paid to them under their respective employment agreements.”). 
 74. Id. at 120–21. Specifically, “by requiring evidence, the shareholder is prevented from 
using the tools at hand” to obtain information about the corporation. Id. at 121 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
 75. Plaintiff’s Opening Brief at 9, Seinfeld v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 909 A.2d 117 (Del. 
2006) (No. 624). 
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The Delaware Supreme Court disagreed finding that the credible 
basis “standard achieves an appropriate balance between providing 
stockholders who can offer some evidence of possible wrongdoing with 
access to corporate records and safeguarding the right of the corporation 
to deny requests for inspections that are based only upon suspicion or 
curiosity.”76 Plaintiff was “concerned about the large amount of compen-
sation paid to the three executives.”77 Such a “disagreement” with the 
company’s business judgment was not sufficient evidence of wrongdo-
ing.78 
The credible basis standard necessarily creates barriers for stock-
holders alleging corporate mismanagement. As Seinfeld illustrates, 
stockholders seeking inspection of corporate books and records must 
offer something more than concern over board behavior. The threshold 
requires affirmative evidence that permits an inference of mismanage-
ment. Practically, however, it can be difficult for stockholders to obtain 
this type of information because whether corporate actions are consistent 
with directors’ fiduciary duties is a matter of the process by which deci-
sions are made.79 
IV.  INSPECTION RIGHTS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY  
Corporations are sometimes said to “have a responsibility to society 
at large.”80 Corporate social responsibility signifies “the ethical and re-
sponsible methods of corporate operations and business practices.”81 
Although “[t]here is no single universal framework describing the activi-
ties that are part of [corporate social responsibility] initiatives,”82 the 
approach generally refers to good business practice in the areas of “envi-
ronmental sustainability . . . stakeholder responsiveness, human rights, 
labor conditions, and social accountability.”83 Pressure to engage in so-
cially responsible behavior often comes from non-shareholders, includ-
ing “consumers, human rights groups, domestic and international labor 
  
 76. Seinfeld, 909 A.2d at 118. 
 77. Id. at 120.  
 78. Id. (affirming the Chancery Court’s finding that the Plaintiff offered no evidence from 
which the court could infer that wrongdoing was in fact occurring). 
 79. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) overruled on other grounds by 
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (finding that the business judgment rule shields the 
board from liability for corporate decisions if “the directors of a corporation acted on an informed 
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company”). 
 80. Mahesh Chandra, ISO Standards from Quality to Environment to Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility and Their Implications for Global Companies, 10 J. INT'L BUS. & L. 107, 110 (2011). 
 81. Alexandra R. Harrington, Corporate Social Responsibility, Globalization, the Multina-
tional Corporation, and Labor: An Unlikely Alliance, 75 ALB. L. REV. 483, 489 (2012). 
 82. Chandra, supra note 80, at 111.  
 83. David Monsma & John Buckley, Article, Non-Financial Corporate Performance: The 
Material Edges of Social and Environmental Disclosure, 11 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 151, 154 (2004) 
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groups, and increasingly the media.”84 In particular, corporate social re-
sponsibility “is attractive to consumers.”85  
Socially responsible behavior can, however, promote profit maxi-
mization.86 Consequently, shareholders often apply pressure through the 
proxy process in an effort to increase corporate social involvement.87 
Although “the specifics of any given corporate social responsibility issue 
vary by industry,”88 common areas of concern include “environmental 
protection[,] . . . sustainable development[,] and labor” conditions.89 
These concerns center around “the relationships between corporate eco-
nomic activity and the health and welfare of the people and environment 
with which the corporate actor interacts.”90 
The issue can become even more complicated with the outsourcing 
of production.91 Although companies may act in a socially responsible 
manner, their suppliers may not. Suppliers may have an incentive to low-
er costs and gain profits “at the expense of workers' health and lives.”92  
Shareholders seeking information about socially responsible activi-
ties, including those of suppliers, have traditionally had few meaningful 
avenues. With respect to inspection rights, shareholders as owners were 
not automatically entitled to information about these types of activities 
but must allege some sort of wrongdoing by the company and the board. 
In addition, the credible basis standard required some affirmative evi-
dence of mismanagement with respect to socially responsible activities. 
This is true despite the fact that “directors must, within the constraints of 
  
 84. Harrington, supra note 81, at 490.  
 85. Brittany T. Cragg, Comment, Home Is Where the Halt Is: Mandating Corporate Social 
Responsibility Through Home State Regulation and Social Disclosure, 24 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 735, 
740 (2010). 
 86. Socially irresponsible business practices may impact shareholder return; for example, “a 
corporation which aids and abets human rights abuse exposes the company to” significant legal risks 
which may in turn impact dividend distributions. Eric Engle, Article, What You Don't Know Can 
Hurt You: Human Rights, Shareholder Activism and SEC Reporting Requirements, 57 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 63, 79 (2006). 
 87. Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 allows shareholders to submit to the 
company proposals for mandatory inclusion in the proxy materials, subject to certain exclusions. 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2015); see also Virginia J. Harnisch, Note, Rule 14a-8 After Reagan: Does It 
Protect Social Responsibility Shareholder Proposals?, 6 J.L. & POL. 415, 446 (1990) (noting that 
social responsibility proposals “sensitize management to important issues, subject management to 
checks, provide information, and offer a forum for shareholder communication. These social respon-
sibility proposals also serve a broader purpose because they afford shareholders the opportunity to 
communicate with each other and management about how major corporations are behaving in a 
variety of areas which significantly impact the public and society at large.”). 
 88. Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globaliza-
tion, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 722 (2002). 
 89. Harrington, supra note 81, at 483. In extractive industries, corporate social responsibility 
issues also include “companies' ‘entanglement’ with repressive governments in infrastructure devel-
opment or security arrangements.” Williams, supra note 88, at 722.  
 90. Williams, supra note 88, at 723.  
 91. Li-Wen Lin, Article, Corporate Social Accountability Standards in the Global Supply 
Chain: Resistance, Reconsideration, and Resolution in China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 321, 
323 (2007). 
 92. Id.  
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the law, make the best interests of stockholders the end goal of the gov-
ernance of a for-profit corporation.”93 While some directors may seek “to 
pursue profits in a high-minded manner that respects the best interests of 
other corporate constituencies[,]”94 they may feel a need “to compromise 
[their] sense of integrity because of a fear that stockholders will demand 
that [they] keep pace with . . . competitors who are less other-
regarding.”95 
Likewise, federal law provided few mechanisms for disclosure of 
this type of information. Disclosure under the securities laws has tradi-
tionally focused on financial information deemed important to inves-
tors.96 Topics related to corporate social responsibility do not necessarily 
meet this criteria.97 As a result, companies did not need to make robust 
disclosure with respect to these issues.98 To the extent that they do so,99 
disclosure is often voluntary and motivated by groups other than share-
holders.100 
Nonetheless, pressure on Congress has resulted in some mandatory 
disclosure of socially responsible behavior even absent a strong nexus to 
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Claire Moore Dickerson, Human Rights: The Emerging Norm of Corporate Social Responsibility, 76 
TUL. L. REV. 1431, 1437 (2002). In addition, companies can address operations in countries with no 
or insufficient labor laws by committing to pay “workers a decent wage.” Harrington, supra note 81, 
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 100. Harrington, supra note 81, at 489–90 (“The pressures on multinational corporations, 
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the financial interests of shareholders.101 Dodd-Frank required the SEC to 
promulgate rules mandating public companies to disclose their use of 
“conflict minerals” originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
and adjoining countries.102 In addition, Dodd-Frank required the SEC to 
adopt rules governing the disclosure of payments made to the federal or 
foreign governments in connection with the commercial development of 
oil, natural gas, or minerals.103 The information was potentially important 
to investors who were “more interested in investing ethically than in 
maximising [sic] the profitability of their investments.”104  
Whatever the benefits, the approach imposes costs. Unlike inspec-
tion rights, which affect companies on a case-by-case basis, federal dis-
closure requirements are categorical and apply to all companies subject 
to the obligation, even where shareholders and the public have little in-
terest in the information. Published reports indicate the total cost of com-
pliance with the conflict minerals rule to be over $700 million.105 Moreo-
ver, the approach has engendered criticism from some at the SEC. One 
chair of the agency described efforts to mandate this type of disclosure as 
“more directed at exerting societal pressure on companies to change be-
havior, rather than to disclose financial information that primarily in-
forms investment decisions.”106 Nonetheless, future intervention by Con-
gress remains a strong possibility.107 
V.  HERSHEY AND THE POSSIBLE SHIFT IN DELAWARE STANDARDS 
The need for federal disclosure requirements may at least in part 
have been related to the apparent unavailability of state law inspection 
rights with respect to social responsibility. A recent decision in Dela-
ware, however, suggests the possibility that the courts are becoming 
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more amenable to the use of inspection rights to obtain information on 
these types of activities. The case arose in the context of a request by a 
shareholder of The Hershey Company seeking information about the use 
of child labor by cocoa producers in Africa.108 
According to the court decision (based upon the allegations in the 
complaint), most of the world’s cocoa (approximately 70%) came from 
West Africa, particularly Ghana and the Ivory Coast.109 In 2001, the use 
of child labor in the production of cocoa received significant public at-
tention.110 Press reports indicated “the prevalence of child labor, forced 
labor, and human trafficking on cocoa farms in West Africa.”111 As a 
result, Congress considered mandatory “‘slave-free’ labeling on cocoa 
products.”112 
Apprehensive of such labeling, chocolate manufacturers opposed 
the proposal.113 As a compromise, the Harkin-Engel Protocol provided 
that major stakeholders in the chocolate industry would work to imple-
ment certification requirements to ensure that cocoa beans were grown 
and processed without the use of child labor by July 1, 2005.114 The Her-
shey Company supported this measure and signed the Protocol.115  
The date came and went without implementation.116 In 2010, the 
United States Department of Labor, the governments of Ghana and the 
Ivory Coast, and the International Chocolate and Cocoa Industry adopted 
a new deadline and provided for a 70% reduction in the use of child labor 
by 2020.117  
On October 4, 2012, Louisiana Municipal Employees’ Retirement 
System (LAMPERS) demanded inspection of the corporate books and 
records concerning Hershey’s awareness of possible human rights viola-
tions within its supply chain.118 In describing the purpose, the demand 
indicated an intent to investigate mismanagement, possible fiduciary 
duty violations, and “the independence and disinterestedness of the 
Board” in connection with “the undisputed and unfortunate endemic use 
of child labor on cocoa farms in West Africa.”119 The investigation 
  
 108. Masters Report at 3, La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Hershey Co., No. 7996-ML (Del. 
Ch. Nov. 8, 2013). 
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sought to examine the company’s failure “to limit its supply chain to 
those suppliers Hershey can verify are not relying on child labor.”120 
The complaint relied on Hershey’s public statements, media reports, 
journal articles and reports by the United States Department of Labor121 
“to make the undeniable point that child labor continues to be common 
on cocoa farms in West Africa, with children forced to leave their fami-
lies and forego schooling to work in horrific conditions.”122 LAMPERS 
also referenced Hershey’s inability to certify, in accordance with Harkin-
Engel, that all of its suppliers were free from child labor123 and asserted 
that the company all but admitted knowledge of the violations by an-
nouncing that 100% of its cocoa supplies would be certified as free from 
human rights abuses by 2020.124 LAMPERS claimed that Hershey’s fail-
ure to adhere to the Protocol’s initial timeframe subjected the company 
to negative publicity and market backlash.125  
Hershey denied the inspection request and LAMPERS filed an ac-
tion under Section 220.126 The Master assigned to the case found the al-
legations established at best that Hershey obtained raw materials from 
countries known to use child labor.127 The complaint, according to the 
Master, failed to “convert those established facts into some evidence of 
possible mismanagement” sufficient to constitute a credible basis for the 
purpose alleged.128 Accordingly, the Master recommended the complaint 
be dismissed.129 
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The Plaintiff took exception and sought review by the Chancery 
Court.130 The Vice Chancellor rejected the Master’s recommendation that 
the action be dismissed.131 In doing so, he found that the complaint suffi-
ciently alleged both a proper purpose and a credible basis. The stock-
holder only had to show “a possibility” of mismanagement, not prove 
that such behavior had actually occurred.132 As a result, in the presence 
of “two competing inferences . . . the plaintiff gets the inference.”133 
The complaint supported inferences “of possible violations of law in 
which Hershey may be involved.”134 The factual allegations made it rea-
sonable to conclude “Hershey’s products contain cocoa and cocoa-
derived ingredients that were the result of child labor and human traffick-
ing” and “that the board knows some of its . . . ingredients are sourced 
from farms” engaging in labor exploitation.135  
Moreover, Hershey’s failure to implement certification require-
ments by July 1, 2005, combined with the company’s subsequent an-
nouncement of its intention to do so by 2020 supported the inference that 
at least some of the company’s cocoa was the product of child labor.136 
As the Vice Chancellor reasoned:  
If I call up, you know, my daughter's school and I say, "Can you con-
firm for me that there's no one on the payroll with a criminal record?" 
and they say to me, "We're not going to do that now, but we hope to 
be able to do so in 2020," I'm going to draw the inference that they 




The inference was further supported by Hershey’s “market-leading 
status and dominant market share.”138 Accordingly, the court denied Her-
shey’s motion to dismiss, allowing the complaint to move forward from 
the pleadings stage to a merits hearing.139 The case, however, was volun-
tarily dismissed by the parties before such a hearing was held.140 
VI. HERSHEY AND THE IMPLICATIONS UNDER SECTION 220 
In some respects, Hershey broke no new ground. The court applied 
the traditional analysis. LAMPERS had to sufficiently allege misman-
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agement in order to meet the proper purpose requirement. In addition, the 
allegations of wrongdoing had to be supported by a credible basis.   
Nonetheless, the decision in practice went beyond the traditional 
approach taken by Delaware courts under Section 220 and has the poten-
tial to significantly improve the accessibility of information concerning a 
corporation’s socially responsible (or irresponsible) behavior. First, the 
court accepted claims of mismanagement that Hershey “support[ed] the 
use of unlawful child labor” and “integrat[ed] this illegal conduct into its 
business model” largely from the widespread knowledge of the problems 
of child labor in the cocoa production process.141  
Similarly, the court relied on a flexible approach towards the credi-
ble basis standard. LAMPERS essentially used the common knowledge 
of child labor violations in the cocoa industry coupled with the compa-
ny’s commitment to reduce the instances of these actions to create an 
inference that the board was aware of the problem. Absent were any spe-
cific allegations of actual knowledge of violations by suppliers or allega-
tions that the specific suppliers used by Hershey relied on child labor. 
This analysis could be repeated with respect to other human rights 
abuses or matters of social responsibility that are likely to affect the sup-
ply chain. Widespread concern exists over worker safety in the garment 
industry.142 Bangladesh, second only to China in textile production, man-
ufactures goods for a significant number of large retailers.143 In 2013, a 
fire killed 112 factory workers in the country.144 Government officials 
and multinational corporations pledged to take steps “to ensure the safety 
of factories where goods they sell are manufactured.”145 Despite the 
pledges, problems remain. More than 100 factory workers died in a 
building collapse shortly after the fire.146  
Similarly, concerns have arisen in Indonesia and Malaysia with de-
forestation that results from the production of palm oil. Most of the 
world’s supply of palm oil is produced in the two countries.147 The palm 
oil production process results in deforestation because the resource 
thrives in “consistently high humidity and temperatures.”148 Accordingly, 
palm oil “plantations are often established at the expense of rainfor-
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ests.”149 As a result of deforestation in Indonesia, the country is now the 
“3rd largest emitter of greenhouse gases globally.”150 Some companies 
that make significant use of palm oil have pledge by a specific date to 
ensure that production is through sustainable sources.151  
Whether the use of palm oil or conditions in textile producing coun-
tries, environmental or labor concerns are widely known, some compa-
nies have made pledges to address these abuses in the supply chain. The 
widespread nature of the problem coupled with the future commitment to 
address the concerns arguably provides both a proper purpose and credi-
ble basis that would justify the inspection of documents related to these 
matters. Moreover, as Hershey indicated, violations not directly attribut-
able to the company but that occurred in supply chain would not be a 
complete defense. To the extent corporations rely on a supply chain that 
is directly tied to human rights violations, the “possibility” of corporate 
involvement exists. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Section 220 of Delaware Corporate Law provides a way for share-
holders to obtain non-public information about companies where they 
invest. The statute requires only that the request be “reasonably related to 
such person’s interest as a stockholder.”152 The courts, however, have 
added a number of interpretive glosses that make inspection rights diffi-
cult. They largely assume that a shareholder’s interest is limited to mis-
management. Moreover, the courts have added the requirement that the 
allegations of management must be supported by a credible basis.  
Hershey, however, signals a more flexible approach, at least with 
respect to the inspection of materials related to corporate social responsi-
bility. In these circumstances, shareholders may be able to meet the cred-
ible basis threshold by showing, through media reports or otherwise, 
widespread public awareness of legal violations in the production pro-
cess and attribute the knowledge to the board.  
Congressional intervention in this area has been characterized “as a 
consequence of state law.”153 To the extent that inspection rights are 
more accessible for such information, however, Congress and the SEC 
may have less incentive to impose affirmative obligations requiring dis-
closure of the same type of information. The result will be disclosure not 
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in a categorical fashion but on a case-by-case basis depending upon the 
needs and interests of shareholders.  
Of course, the case is only one decision and reflects the views of 
only one Vice Chancellor, albeit a jurist stating that he was simply rely-
ing on existing precedent in Delaware.154 Moreover, because the parties 
agreed to dismiss the case, the applicable issues were not reviewed by 
the Delaware Supreme Court.155 Nonetheless, the case did not alter the 
legal framework but instead adopted a flexible approach to existing legal 
standards. That subsequent decisions may do the same remains, there-
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